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16677214 |
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20230203165756.0 |
007 - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FIXED FIELD--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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cr aa aaaaa |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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110304s2011 enk b 001 0 eng |
010 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONTROL NUMBER |
LC control number |
2011288179 |
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
International Standard Book Number |
9780511813481 |
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
Original cataloging agency |
DLC |
Transcribing agency |
DLC |
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE |
Language code of text/sound track or separate title |
eng. |
042 ## - AUTHENTICATION CODE |
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pcc |
050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
Classification number |
K1327 |
Item number |
.D8 2011 |
082 00 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER |
Classification number |
346/.0664 |
Edition number |
22 |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Preferred name for the person |
Du Plessis, J. J. |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
Title |
Principles of contemporary corporate governance / |
Statement of responsibility, etc |
Jean Jacques du Plessis, Anil Hargovan, Mirko Bagaric ; contributors Vivienne Bath, Christine Jubb, Luke Nottage. |
250 ## - EDITION STATEMENT |
Edition statement |
2nd ed. |
264 #1 - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
Place of publication, distribution, etc |
Cambridge [England] ; |
-- |
New York : |
Name of publisher, distributor, etc |
Cambridge University Press, |
Date of publication, distribution, etc |
2012 |
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
Extent |
1 online resource (xxii, 395 pages) |
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
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text |
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txt |
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rdacontent |
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
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computer |
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c |
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rdamedia |
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
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online resource |
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cr |
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rdacarrier |
504 ## - BIBLIOGRAPHY, ETC. NOTE |
Bibliography, etc |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
505 ## - CONTENTS |
Formatted contents note |
Contents<br/>Table of cases<br/>Table of statutes<br/>Preface<br/>1 The concept 'corporate governance' and essential corporate governance principles<br/> The meaning of corporate governance<br/> Generally<br/> Origins of the corporate governance debate and the stakeholder debate<br/> Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to the European Union and its Members (January 2002)<br/> King Report (South Africa), Executive Summary of the King Report - King Report on Corporate Governance (March 2002)<br/> Australian Stock Exchange (ASX): Corporate Governance Council Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations<br/>(March 2003)<br/> Report of the HIH Royal Commission (Owen Report) (April 2004)<br/> OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (April 2004)<br/> Definition of 'corporate governance'<br/> Essential corporate governance principles<br/> Generally<br/> The King Report (2002)<br/> Characteristic 1: Discipline<br/> Characteristic 2: Transparency<br/> Characteristic 3: Independence<br/> Characteristic 4: Accountability<br/> Characteristic 5: Responsibility<br/> Characteristic 6: Fairness<br/> Characteristic 7: Social responsibility<br/> The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX): Corporate Governance Council Best Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations<br/> Principle 1: Lay solid foundations for management oversight<br/> Principle 2: Structure the board to add value<br/> Principle 3: Promote ethical and responsible decision-making<br/> Principle 4: Safeguard integrity in financial reporting<br/> Principle 5: Make timely and balanced disclosure<br/> Principle 6: Respect the rights of shareholders<br/> Principle 7: Recognise and manage risk<br/> Principle 8: Encourage enhanced performance<br/> Principle 9: Remunerate fairly and responsibly<br/> Principle 10: Recognise the legitimate interests of shareholders<br/> Is 'good corporate governance' important and does it add value?<br/> Concluding remarks<br/>2 Stakeholders in corporate governance<br/> 1 Introduction<br/> 2 Stakeholders in the corporation: an overview<br/>(a) What is a stakeholder?<br/>(b) Discussion of different stakeholders<br/> Shareholders<br/> Employees<br/> Creditors<br/> Customers<br/> The community<br/> The environment<br/> Government<br/> 3 Stakeholders' interests and the corporation: the rule of law<br/> (a) The Australian position<br/> (b) Analysis - the appropriate boundaries of corporate governance regulation<br/> (c) Overseas position: a snapshot<br/> OECD<br/> European Union<br/> United States<br/> South Africa<br/> United Kingdom<br/> 4 Stakeholder interests, good governance and the interests of the corporation: a mutual relationship<br/> (a) General analysis<br/> (b) Case study on James Hardie's asbestos compensation settlement<br/> 5 Concluding remarks: a case for shareholder primacy<br/>3 Board functions and board structures<br/>The organs of governance<br/>Board functions<br/>Board structures<br/> The 'unitary' and 'two-tier' structures compared<br/>Board structures in the broader context of a good corporate governance model<br/> Overview<br/> Effective support mechanisms to assist the board in fulfilling its functions properly<br/> Effective statutory provisions<br/> Effective regulators<br/> Charters, policies and codes of best practice and conduct<br/>4 Types of company directors and officers<br/> Definition of 'director'<br/> De jure and de factor directors covered<br/> Shadow director<br/> Definition of officer<br/> Statutory definition<br/> Senior employees and senior executives as 'officers'<br/> Middle-management as 'officers'?<br/> Types of company officers<br/> Executive and non-executive directors<br/> Independent non-executive directors<br/> Lead independent directors or senior independent directors<br/> The manager director or chief executive officer (CEO)<br/> Chairperson<br/> Alternate director<br/> Secretary<br/> Training and induction of directors<br/> Training<br/> Induction of new directors<br/> Ethical behaviour by directors<br/>5 Corporate Governance in Australia - background and business initiatives<br/> Background to the corporate governance debate in Australia<br/> The Bosch Report<br/> Background<br/> Bosch Report (1991)<br/> Later refinement and expansions<br/> The Bosch Report (1993)<br/> The Bosch Report (1995)<br/> Divergence from UK practice: 1995 till early 2003<br/> The Hilmer Report<br/> Background<br/> The Hilmer Report (1993)<br/> The Hilmer Report (1998)<br/> The virtues of good corporate governance in Australia between 1991 and 1998<br/> The IFSA Blue Book<br/> Concluding remarks<br/>6 Regulation of corporate governance<br/> Overview of chapter<br/> Regulation generally<br/> 3 Objectives in regulating corporate governance<br/> 4 Sources of regulation in Australia<br/> (a) 'Hard law<br/> (i) Statutory regulation - corporate law<br/> (ii) Statutory regulation - other than corporate law<br/> (iii) 'Corporate govenance and the judges': the place of judge-made law<br/> (b) 'Hybrids'<br/> (i) ASX listing rules<br/> (ii) Accounting standards<br/> (c) 'Soft law'<br/> The role of market forces<br/> 5 Towards an effective corporate governance framework in Australia - analysis and reform proposal<br/> (a) OECD's guidelines for achieving an effective governance framework<br/> (b) Proposed MOU on corporate governance between ASX and ASIC<br/> 6 Conclusion<br/>7 The role of the regulators: ASX and ASIC<br/> The Australian Stock Exchange Ltd (ASX)<br/> Slow to get out of the blocks<br/> Rapid change in attitude since the end of 2002<br/> ASX Corporate Governance Council's Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations<br/> Parts and layout<br/> Recommendations<br/> A few concluding remarks<br/> The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)<br/> History<br/> Constitution and some statutory powers<br/> Initial steps by ASIC after the HIH collapse<br/> Actions instituted by ASIC against directors after the HIH collapse<br/> Actions by ASIC<br/> Court orders<br/> Some considerations regarding the period of disqualification<br/> Criminal prosecutions<br/> Aim with high profile prosecutions<br/> ASIC enforcement patterns<br/> The role of ASIC in corporate governance<br/> Limits of ASIC's powers and responsibilities?<br/> Concluding remarks<br/>8 CLERP 9 reforms to the Corporations Act<br/> 1 Overview<br/> 2 The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program<br/> 3 Impetus for CLERP 9: responding to corporate collapses<br/> 4 Explanation of key CLERP 9 reforms<br/> (a) Audit reform<br/> (b) Corporate disclosure<br/> (i) Remuneration of directors and executives<br/> (ii) Financial reporting<br/> (iii) Continuous disclosure<br/> (iv) Shareholder participation<br/> (v) Whistleblowers<br/> (vi) Disclosure rules<br/> (c) Miscellaneous<br/> Managing conflict by financial services licensees<br/> Register of relevant interests<br/> Officers, senior managers and employees<br/> Enforcement<br/> Proportionate liability<br/> 5 Corporate law reform post-CLERP 9<br/> 6 Concluding remarks<br/>9 Implementation of the ASX Best Practice Recommendations: charters, policies and codes<br/> 1 Implementing the ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations<br/> 2 Best Practice Recommendations requiring charters and policies<br/> 3 Practice examples of implementing ASX Best Practice Recommendations<br/> (a) Charters<br/> (b) Company policies and codes<br/> Code of conduct<br/> Trading policy<br/> Disclosure policy<br/> Shareholder communication policy<br/> Risk management policy<br/> Remuneration policy<br/> 4 Concluding remarks<br/>10 Auditors and audits<br/> 10.1 Introduction: the audit role and where it fits into corporate governance<br/> 10.1.1 Overview of the audit role<br/> 10.1.2 The link between the audit role and corporate governance<br/> 10.2 Wholesale recent changes to audit role<br/> 10.3 Auditor independence<br/> 10.3.1 Overview of rationale behind independence requirement<br/> 10.3.2 General requirement for auditor independence<br/> 10.3.3 Meaning of 'conflict of interest situation'<br/> 10.3.4 Disclosing and resolving conflicts<br/> 10.3.5 Specific independence requirements - minimising conflict of interest through employment and financial restrictions<br/> 10.3.6 Auditor rotation<br/> 10.3.7 Disclosure of non-audit services<br/> 10.4 Auditors and the AGM<br/> 10.5 Auditors' duties<br/> 10.6 Reducing the legal exposure of auditors<br/> 10.6.1 Overview of auditors' liability<br/> 10.6.2 Registration of audit companies<br/> 10.6.3 Proportionate liability<br/> 10.7 Qualification of auditors<br/> 10.8 Uniform auditing standards<br/> 10.9 Audit oversight<br/> 10.10 Concluding remarks<br/>11 Directors' duties and liability<br/> Introduction<br/> Part 9.4b - civil penalty provisions or pecuniary penalty provisions<br/> Overview<br/> The civil penalty provisions in particular<br/> s 180: duty of care and diligence - civil obligation<br/> s 181: duty of good faith - civil obligation<br/> s 182 and 183: duty not to use position or information to gain personally or cause detriment to the corporation<br/> Part 2E: duty relating to related party transactions<br/> Part 2H: duty relating to share capital transactions<br/> Part 2M.2 and 2M.3: duty relating to requirements for financial reports<br/> Part 5.7B: duty to prevent insolvent trading<br/> Part 5C: duties relating to managed investment schemes<br/> Chapter 6A: duty relating to continuous disclosure<br/> Part 710: duty not to be involved in market misconduct and other prohibited conduct relating to financial products and financial services<br/> Market manipulation<br/> False trading and marker rigging<br/> Dissemination of information about illegal transactions<br/> Insider trading<br/> Subclause 29(6) of Schedule 4: duty relating to disclosure for proposed demutualisation<br/> Case study regarding civil penalty provisions or pecuniary penalty provisions: ASIC v Adler<br/> Overview<br/> Summary of the facts<br/> Contravention of civil penalty provisions<br/> Related party transactions (Chapter 2E)<br/> Financial assistance (Part 2J.3)<br/> Duty of care and diligence (s 180)<br/> Duty of good faith (s 181)<br/> Use of position to gain advantage for oneself or another or to cause detriment to the corporation (s 182)<br/> Improper use of information (s 183)<br/> <br/> Court orders<br/> Enforcement of directors' duties<br/> Overview<br/> The statutory derivative action: Part 2F.1A<br/> The case to introduce a statuory derivative action<br/> Eligible applicant<br/> Cause of action<br/> Leave of court required to institute the statutory derivative action<br/> Oppressive conduct of affairs: Part 2F.1<br/> Type of conduct covered by Part 2F.1<br/> Who may apply for relief under Part 2F.1?<br/> Introduction<br/> Members<br/> Nature of relief available under Part 2F.1<br/> Section 1324 injunctions<br/> Introduction<br/> Section 1324(1)<br/> Court's discretion<br/> Remedies in particular<br/> Injunctions<br/> Damages<br/> Criminal liability of directors<br/> The importance of criminal sanction in the corporations law<br/> Selected criminal offences directors and other officers can commit under the Corporations Act<br/> General<br/> Specific offences for breaches of duties<br/> Primary duties of directors<br/> Some other primary offences that directors can commit<br/> Conclusion<br/>12 Corporate governance in selected jurisdictions and the OECD principles of corporate governance<br/> United States<br/> Background to the corporate governance debate in the US<br/> The American Law Institute's (ALI) involvement in the corporatate governance debate<br/> Basic aims of the project<br/> Impact and importance of the project<br/> Some of key aspects addressed<br/> Topics<br/> The objectives and conduct of the corporation<br/> Structure of the corporation<br/> General<br/> s 3.01: management of the corporation's business<br/> s 3.02: functions and powers of the board of directors<br/> The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 - the US response to collapses like Enron and WorldCom<br/> Backdrop<br/> Aims and objectives<br/> NYSE: sections 303 and 303A - corporate governance rules<br/> Background<br/> Summary of the most important NYSE corporate governance rules<br/> United Kingdom<br/> Background to the corporate governance debate in the UK<br/> The Cadbury Report of the unfolding of the concept of 'corporate governance' in the UK<br/> Context of Cadbury Report<br/> Code of best practice<br/> Further developments<br/> The Greenbury Report (1995), the Hampel Report (1998), the Smith Report (2003) and the Higgs Report (2003)<br/> The UK combined code<br/> Germany<br/> Background to the corporate governance debate in Germany<br/> The German corporate governance code<br/> Background to its adoption<br/> Parts, layout and explanatory nature of the German code<br/> Employee participation at supervisory board level or codetermination<br/> The German board structure<br/>OECD principles of corporate governance<br/> Background to OECD principles of corporate governance<br/> Broad aims and application<br/> Parts and layout<br/> Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework<br/> Disclosure and transparency<br/>13 The case for enhanced shareholder participation in corporate decision-making<br/> 13.1 Introduction<br/> 13.1.1 Overview of recommendations in this chapter<br/> 13.1.2 Outline of independence thesis<br/> 13.1.3 Outline of multiple shakeholder theseis<br/> 13.1.4 What is an independent director?<br/> 13.2 The primacy of shareholder interests: arguments in favour of greater shareholder participation in management<br/> 13.2.1 Shareholders own the company<br/> 13.2.2 Shareholder interests are most closely aligned with those of the company<br/> 13.3 The independence thesis<br/> 13.3.1 Diverse ownership naturally leads to the exclusio of owners in decision-making<br/> 13.3.2 Does independence lead to better decision-making and higher profitability?<br/> 13.4 Multiple stakeholder thesis<br/> 13.4.1 The managerial quality argument<br/> 13.4.2 Independent directors care more about fringe players<br/> 13.5 Law reform in a climate where relevant empirical evidence is lacking<br/> 13.6 Where to now?<br/> 13.6.1 Non-independent directors<br/> 13.6.2 Shareholder committees<br/> Composition<br/> Functions<br/> Powers<br/> General<br/> 13.7 Concluding remarks<br/>14 The ethical obligations of corporations<br/> 1 Introduction<br/> 2 The threshold issue: is there a role for ethical considerations in business?<br/> 2.1 A short look at the short history of business ethics<br/> 2.2 The disunity between business and ethics arguments<br/> 2.3 Morality applies to business because moral judgements are universalisable<br/> 2.4 Exception to universalistion - activities with internal settled rules?<br/> 2.5 Are moral norms too vague to apply to business?<br/> 2.6 Promise to shareholders to maximise profits as basis for rejecting application of moral principles to business?<br/> 2.7 Summary of the general link between business and ethics<br/> 3 Application of moral principle to business setting<br/> 3.1 Types of duties imposed on corporation - proscriptions against causing harm, lying and environmental damage already legally enforced<br/> 3.2 Additional duties imposed on corporations - a duty of benevolence?<br/> 3.2.1 Acts and omissions doctrine serves to minimise obligations on corporations<br/> 3.2.2 Principal duty is for corporations to comply with law - business is morally neutral<br/> 3.2.3 A more elaborate duty - extreme wealth and maxim of positive duty<br/> 3.2.4 Requirement to pay social dividend<br/> 3.3 Extreme wealth and duty not to frustrate access to justice<br/> 4 Summary<br/>15 Reflections on contemporary corporate governance and its future direction<br/> 1 Introduction<br/> 2 Regulatory pyramid and the cycles of regulation: a perspective on contemporary corporate governance regulation<br/> 3 Interaction of cycles of regulation and 'law and norms' discourse<br/> (a) The significance of norms<br/> (b) Norms, corporate governance and the utility of behavioural analysis<br/> 4 Concluding remarks: corporate governance regulation going forward<br/>Index |
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Corporate governance |
General subdivision |
Law and legislation. |
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Comparative law. |
655 #0 - INDEX TERM--GENRE/FORM |
Genre/form data or focus term |
Electronic books. |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Hargovan, Anil, |
Dates associated with a name |
1962- |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Bagaric, Mirko. |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Bath, Vivienne. |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Jubb, Christine. |
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Nottage, Luke. |
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
Link text |
Full text available from Cambridge University Press Click here to view |
Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/principles-of-contemporary-corporate-governance/73681FC8D4569775FF90843982CD5200 |
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20 |
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Item type |
EBOOK |